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THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN INTERPRETING
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
William E. Nelson*
How can recourse to history provide the Supreme Court with an
approach to interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments in general and
the Fourteenth Amendment in particular? In The Fourteenth Amendment: From PoliticalPrinciple to Judicial Doctrine,' I argued that recourse to history in the form of original intention 'could not by itself
provide any simple, unidimensional interpretive principle with which to
give clear meaning to the text of Section 1.2 I showed that Section 1
emerged out of the Radical Republicans' commitment to the protection
of human rights and equality and that the section could never be comprehended fully except by reference to that commitment.' On the other
hand, I also showed that when Democrats in Congress and in the state
legislatures objected that the Fourteenth Amendment would alter existing balances of federalism in fundamental ways, Republicans responded that Section 1 would have no effect in states like those in the
North that accorded their citizens the rights listed in the Bill of Rights
together with other fundamental rights.4 Keeping faith with this history
would require the Court, in a role of discoverer of original intent, to take
seriously the amendment's commitment to local self-rule.
I concluded from this history that the men who framed and ratified
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment meant simultaneously to protect
rights and to preserve the then-existing balance of federalism.' Although
the protection of rights and the preservation of federalism strike us as
inconsistent goals, I argued that the two goals seemed far more consistent to the Radicals, who had had a long history of using state institu* Professor of Law and History, New York University; A.B., 1962, Hamilton College;
LL.B., 1965, New York University; Ph.D., 1971, Harvard University. The author is indebted
to the New York University Legal History Colloquium and especially to Christopher Eisgruber for helpful comments and criticisms. The author is indebted to William Braverman for
research assistance.
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tions to protect human rights.6 I noted, however, that as soon as cases

involving Section 1 came before the Supreme Court, the tension between
rights protection and local self-rule became apparent. Once the Justices
came face to face with this tension that had lain beneath the surface of
the amendment throughout the process of its enactment and ratification,
the Court could not, of course, come to any resolution by simple recourse

to original intent.
The best the Court could do, I maintained, was what it did in its first

four decades of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication, beginning with the
Slaughter-House Cases8 in 1873. It pursued a middle path between excessive protection of rights to a degree that would destroy local power
and excessive concerns about local power that would lead to the repression of rights. Doctrinally the Court allowed states to determine the

scope of their citizens' rights but then required that all citizens be treated
equally in their enjoyment of those rights. 9 However, beginning with

Lochner v. New York,' 0 the Court abandoned its course of protecting
only equality in the enjoyment of rights rather than rights themselves.II

Since Lochner the Court has behaved more haphazardly, at times insisting only that states act rationally and equally in enforcing rights, but at

other times identifying certain rights as fundamental and requiring their
absolute protection.12
In light of this history, how should the Supreme Court interpret the

Fourteenth Amendment today? The controlling principle that will give
definitive meaning to Section 1 is not readily available either in the
amendment's text or in the original intentions of its framers and ratifiers.
6. Id at 36-39.
7. Id at 160-67.
8. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9. See NELSON, supra note 1, at 174-96.
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. See NELSON, supra note 1, at 197-200.
12. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (right to private homosexual activity not fundamental therefore legislation prohibiting such conduct analyzed using rational basis standard) and Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (right of
producers or refiners of petroleum products to operate retail service stations not fundamental
therefore statute prohibiting such action analyzed using rational basis standard) and San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right to education not fundamental
therefore Texas system of public financing subject to rational basis standard) and Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (right to welfare not fundamental therefore statute limiting
amount of welfare analyzed using rational basis standard) with Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (right to marry fundamental and absolutely protected) and Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (same) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy is fundemental and absolutely protected) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42
(1942) (right to procreate is fundamental and absolutely protected).
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Nor is there a clear, unvarying path of Supreme Court adjudication from
which fixed doctrine can be distilled. The controlling principle for interpreting Section 1 must come instead from some contemporary judgment
about how best to apply the amendment.
Two striking historical events suggest one approach from which
such a judgment might flow. This approach will be set forth below in a
most tentative fashion, with no claim that it is the only or even the best
possible approach.
One of the two events is the collapse of communism in the streets of
Moscow in August 1991. Notably, the communist leaders in the Kremlin commanded enormous coercive power at the time they staged their
coup. The Soviet military enjoyed unrestrained technological superiority
over the Moscow populace, with the capacity to eliminate the entire population through a single nuclear strike or to kill people seriatim with
weapons such as tanks and tactical air strikes. 3 But communist ideology
no longer possessed any power to inspire either the Russian masses or the
military. Meanwhile, a dream of Western-style freedom inspired
thousands who took to the streets in protest and dared the army to put
them down.14 The uninspired soldiers refused to fire their weapons of
destruction on the inspired protesters, and with their refusal, communism died. I"
The triumph of the British raj in nineteenth century India is the
other event suggesting the same approach to interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the mid-nineteenth century, a military force containing
less than 40,000 men from the British Isleslo--substantially fewer than
the 671,654 police in the United States in 1988I 1 -- kept an entire subcontinent with a population approaching 150 million people under subjugation." While the British army undoubtedly had organizational and
technological superiority, the main British weapon was the ability to coopt Indian elites into supporting British rule. The British, that is, inspired Indian elites with a promise of a better life in a Westernized culture than one in a traditional culture: through English-style education,
13. See Celeste Bohlen, The Soviet Crisis: Moscow FearsIt Awoke to a Nightmare, N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 20, 1991, at Al (discussing fears of Soviet populace due to military takeover).
14. Id.; Bill Keller, The Soviet Crisis: Gorbachev andHis Fateful Step, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 1991, at Al.
15. Francis X. Clines, K.G.B.-Military Rulers Tighten Grip, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1991,
at Al.
16. MICHAEL EDVARDES, BOUND TO EXILE: THE VICTORIANS IN INDIA 12 (1969).
17. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 187 (11lth ed. 1991).
18. EDWARDES, supra note 16, at 12.
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the creation of Western markets and an unthinking assumption of cultural superiority, the British created an ideology that conferred far
greater power on them in India than their minuscule army could ever
have done.1 9 As one historian has written, British dominance in India
was not merely, not even primarily, the result of British military power.... Remembering the vast size of the territory defended and administered in British India alone (not counting
the so-called Native States) and the total of its population, it is
obvious that the British could never have done it alone, and
indeed that they never even considered doing so. In other
words, most Indians were willing collaborators . . . . [T]he
English... offered, as no other alien or indigenous system had
done in Indian memory, a degree of civil order and a set of new
attitudes and techniques focused on economic growth from
which some Indians as well as Englishmen could gain.2"
These two examples suggest that ideologies with inspirational power
may be as important as military technology and coercive legal institutions in enabling a government to rule effectively. The two examples also
suggest an approach to the question posed at the outset of this Essaywhether history can provide the Supreme Court with guidance in properly interpreting Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. They suggest
that, after identifying the diverse, competing principles that the framers
and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated into its text, the
Court should examine the inspirational power of those principles. It
should thereupon commit itself to the furtherance of the principles best
able to generate public support for the judiciary's duty to "administer
justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to
'2 1
the rich."
There are, as we have seen, two competing sets of principles-federalism and local, legislative self-rule on the one hand, and equality and
protection of fundamental rights on the other. The first set of principles,
in and of themselves, lack inspirational power. Among judges, lawyers
and law professors, occasional proceduralists may be inspired by doctrines of federalism, but the public at large is typically indifferent to the
19. See FRANCIS G. HUTCHINS, THE ILLUSION OF PERMANENCE: BRITISH IMPERIALISM
IN INDIA 101-18 (1967) (explaining English aristocracy and economics as it existed in India);
SIR PENDEREL MOON, THE BRITISH CONQUEST AND DOMINION OF INDIA 483-90 (1989)
(describing British attitude of superiority); RHOADS MURPHEY, THE OUTSIDERS: THE WESTERN EXPERIENCE IN INDIA AND CHINA 66-79 (1977) (explaining that many politically savvy
Indians found British rule appealing).
20. MURPHEY, supra note 19, at 66-67.

21. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1988).
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doctrinal issues determined in cases such as Teague v. Lane.2 2 Some people and, probably, most lawyers may care whether minority defendants
are tried in criminal cases by juries representing a racially fair cross-section of the community-the underlying substantive issue in Teague. But
only federal judges and federal court mavens care about the narrow issue
in Teague-whether new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review and thus, in
turn, whether state or federal judges should resolve the underlying substantive issue.
Likewise, issues concerning the allocation of power among equal
branches of government and practices of judicial deference to legislative
decision-making, in and of themselves, inspire no one but occasional lawyers and proceduralists. The general public does not care about a case
like United States v. Munoz-Flores,2 3 which held that a statute imposing a
monetary special assessment on a defendant convicted of aiding the illegal entry of aliens into the United States was not a revenue measure and
hence did not violate the clause of the Constitution requiring revenue
measures to originate in the House of Representatives rather than the
Senate. While people do care about how much they pay in taxes and
perhaps about whether illegal aliens gain entry into the United States,
few Americans know that the Constitution requires revenue bills to originate in the House and even fewer care.
Doctrines of federalism, separation of powers and judicial deference
to legislative decision-making gain some bite, however, from the linkages
they have to other deeper and more compelling policies. Federalism, for
example, is linked to more meaningful concerns about local self-rule.
When John W. Davis argued for the various school boards in Brown v.
Board of Education2 4 that "the very strength and fiber of our federal
system is local self-government" under the control of "those most immediately affected by it,"25 he struck a responsive chord in the South where
local self-rule had real meaning. But localism inspired Southerners because of the substantive ends it furthered-ends fundamentally racist in
nature. Only forces outside Southern communities had the capacity to
end white repression of blacks in the South, and preservation of local
autonomy offered a means of continuing the exclusion of outsiders from
22. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
23. 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE

JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN

v

BOARD OF EDUCA-

TION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 574 (1975) (quoting John W. Davis).
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Southern political life and thereby preserving white insiders' hegemony
over blacks.
Localism has, indeed, typically been connected to racism, nativism
and other sorts of xenophobia in American history. From as early as
1660, when Massachusetts Puritans drove Quaker refugees out of Boston,2 6 through centuries of Southern negrophobia,2 7 to the efforts of New
York in the 1960s to keep Spanish speakers from voting, 28 local governments have worked to preserve the power of local elites and to prevent
outsiders and underclasses from participating in established local institutions on equal terms with those who controlled them. Many Americans
value this local power immensely and gain inspiration from calls to preserve it. Yet the Supreme Court, which should search in its constitutional decision-making for inspirational principles that call out the best
rather than the worst in Americans, has no business protecting racism,
nativism and xenophobia. To the extent that arguments in support of
federalism and local self-rule are a mere pretext for bigotry, the Court
must not heed them. The Justices, instead, are obligated by their oaths
to "administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right" to
29
all.
At times, arguments protective of federalism and localism overlap
with concerns about separation of powers and deference to legislative decision-making. They become, in effect, concerns about the preservation
of democratic processes and democratic self-rule. How much inspirational force can a judicial commitment to democratic decision-making,
and a resultant commitment in support of judicial deference to legislative
policy judgments, have? The answer, I suggest, depends on how the
democratic process is functioning.
Today, democracy carries little inspiration for many Americans, as
30
shown by a prevalent distrust of politics and increasing voter apathy.
26. See JONATHAN M. CHU, NEIGHBORS, FRIENDS, OR MADMEN: THE PURITAN ADJUSTMENT IN 17TH CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS 3-12 (1985); PHILLIP F. GURA, A GLIMPSE
OF SION'S GLORY: PURITAN RADICALISM IN NEW ENGLAND 1620-1660, at 144-52 (1984).
27. See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE 235-44 (1969)
(discussing causes of negrophobia); WILLIAM SUMNER JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN
THE OLD SOUTH 242-84 (1935); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 101-35 (1968); LARRY E. WISE, PRO-SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, 1701-1840, at 124-79 (1990).
28. The practice of discrimination in New York against Spanish-speaking voters from
Puerto Rico and the effort of Congress to remedy the wrong are outlined in Katzenbach v.

Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643-47 (1966).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1988).
30. See E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 9-11 (1991) (discussing politicians' trivialization of issues as jading American public toward democratic process).
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The problem lies with our currently dominant conception of democracy.
Americans tend to understand democratic politics as a struggle between
interest groups, each of which is striving to maximize its share of society's resources and power. Democracy appears to have little connection
with the disinterested pursuit of the public good. On the contrary, democracy seems merely to be a set of institutional procedures, like federalism and separation of powers, that enable one private interest to triumph
over another.3 '
Such a view of democracy has little inspirational power: the fact
that people with one point of view gain a few more votes than people
with a competing point of view provides no reason why the first viewpoint should dominate the second. The mere fact, for instance, that heterosexual men outnumber but nevertheless fear homosexual men is not a
basis for criminalizing homosexuality. Arguments like those in Bowers v.
Hardwick,3 2 that the "Court ... comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution" and thereby "takes
to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority ' 3 3 mean little to most people in the context of a case
determining the constitutionality of criminalizing sodomy. Far more
compelling to many Americans is Justice Blackmun's dissenting argument in Bowers "that depriving individuals of the right to choose for
themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far
greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's history
than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do.",34 Equally compelling
to others is Chief Justice Burger's concurring statement that declaring
"the act of homosexual sodomy.., somehow protected as a fundamental
right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching. '35 In the end,
analyses of the duty of judges to defer to legislative policy choices does
not explain why sodomy should be a crime. Only the moral evil of sodomy, if in fact one believes it to be morally evil, can constitute a legitimate reason for making it a crime. And the ultimate argument for
31. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs 280-98 (1989) (discussing difficulties in notion of common good from traditionalist, modernist and pluralist perspectives);
DIONNE, supra note 30, at 142-44 (discussing adoption by liberal Democrats of special interest
group causes instead of creating integrated platform for public good as condemning Democratic Party to anti-democratic factionalism).
32. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
33. Id. at 194-95.
34. Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 197 (Burger, J.,
concurring).
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decriminalization
is " 'the right [of people] to be let alone'" in their inti36
mate affairs.

But while democracy has little rhetorical pull today, it has had
greater inspirational power at times in the past. During the New Deal,
for example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt linked claims on behalf of
democracy to claims about social justice; in his vision, the triumph of
democracy would bring with it the triumph of social justice. Democracy
thus gained inspirational power during the New Deal because Roosevelt
was able to portray narrow private and special interests as the enemy of
democracy, and to convince people that the triumph of democracy would
bring an end to the pursuit of special interests inimical to the attainment
of justice.37 By invalidating legislation of the democratically chosen
President and Congress, the Supreme Court cast itself in the role of representative of special interests holding back reforms beneficial to the people as a whole.38 As a result, "the face-off between the Executive and the
Court in the 1930's ...resulted in the repudiation of much of the sub-

stantive gloss that the Court had placed '3on
the Due Process Clauses of
9
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Thus, while judicial appeals to legislative deference today lack inspirational power in the context of cases like Bowers v. Hardwick," they did
have that power in the 1930s in the hands of a Brandeis, Cardozo or
Stone. This history suggests that the eagerness ofjudges to defer to legislative policy choices, or in the alternative to declare them constitutionally invalid, must accordingly depend upon subtle contextual judgments
about whether the legislature acted as representative of the people at
large or of mere special interests, and about whether the Court possesses
an inspirational principle upon which the court can base an act of
invalidation.
36. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, ., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(1967)).
37. See ALAN BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST: HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN, AND
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 79-81 (1982) (sharing the wealth was popular idea during Franklin
D. Roosevelt's administration); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS wITH DESTINY 202-03, 207 (1990) (comparing special interests to overthrow of royalty
as requirement to restore democracy); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURT, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 183-84 (1963) (characterizing economic elite as inspiring

imposition of industrial dictatorship).
38. See DIONNE, supra note 30, at 142 (discussing reliance on judicial decisions by liberal

Democrats as means to implement social change instead of political reform as bypassing democratic process); FREIDEL, supra note 37, at 162-64, 225-26 (describing Supreme Court's initial
opposition to New Deal legislation).

39. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
40. Id.
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Where, in sum, can the Court find inspirational foundations for constitutional decisions in Fourteenth Amendment cases? One easy answer
is to turn to promotion of equality and protection of fundamental
rights-principles with a textual base in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and with an intentionalist base in the original understanding
of the amendment's framers. Promoting equality and protecting rights is
always inspirational. But this is not the only source to which the Court
can turn for inspiration; democracy, at times, is another. A democratic
legislative decision codifying the will of the people at large and promoting the general interest against some narrow special interest should at
times also command judicial respect. Whether respect for democracy
has rhetorical pull always depends, however, on the nature of the legislative process in any particular case and on how the legislation under challenge actually functions in the world. When, as in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., ' legislation such as the National Labor Relations
Act furthers the public good by stimulating economic growth and equalizing the bargaining power of competing economic groups, the Court
should uphold it. But when, as in Bowers v. Hardwick,42 legislation represents the triumph of one interest or lifestyle over another, the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes the Court to strike it down if it treats
individuals unequally or deprives them of their fundamental rights.

41. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
42. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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